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Abstract
In this paper weintroduce an overlapping generations structure of
the Blanchard type in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model.
This allows us to study a wider range of ¯scal shocks compared to the
traditional Mundell-Fleming and to the baseline Redux models. One
important policy implication of our model is that the tax cut imple-
mented in the US in 2001 might have contributed to the appreciation
of the Dollar vis-a-vis the Euro. In contrast, the imposition of ¯scal
constraint such as the \Golden Rule" proposed by theUKgovernment
can have opposite exchange rate e®ects.
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The study of the international e®ects of ¯scal policy shocks is a classical
exercise in open-economy macroeconomics, that dates back at least to the
original development of the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model.1 Fiscal policy,
however, has received comparatively less attention than monetary policy in
recent theoretical research based on microfounded, general-equilibrium mod-
els with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities.
An obvious example of this unbalance canbe foundin the development of
the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature.2 In surveying
this ¯eld of research Lane (2001, p. 236), makes a point of focusing almost
completely on the analysis of monetary shocks because \This re°ects the em-
phasis in the literature". The fact that the potential of the NOEM framework
to study ¯scal shocks has been only marginally exploited so far is surprising,
especially considering that an explicitly intertemporal setting provides the
potential for spelling out in much more detail, compared to the traditional
Mundell-Fleming (MF) approach, the e®ects of the di®erent components of
a ¯scal expansion.
While there is little doubt about the fact that a monetary shock implies
a surprise change in the interest rate, a ¯scal shock can be implemented in
many di®erent ways. Since the government can use taxes, spending and debt
as ¯scal instruments, any change in the mix of two of these variables, keeping
the third one constant, represents a di®erent prototype of ¯scal shock. In
spite of this, the few existing papers in the NOEM literature that analyse
1Mundell (1968), Fleming (1962).
2The NOEM approach combines perfect foresight and optimising behaviour with mar-
ket imperfections such as imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. The starting point
of this literature is usually considered to be the Redux model provided by Obstfeld and
Rogo® (1995). Lane (2001) and Sarno (2000) provide excellent surveys. Ganelli and Lane
(2002) focus on more recent developments in the ¯eld.
3¯scal issues limit their analysis to balanced-budget policies.3
In this paper we develop a non-Ricardian general equilibrium model with
imperfect competition and sticky prices that can be used to shed some light
on issues like the e®ects of di®erent types of ¯scal shocks on the exchange
rateandonother macroeconomicvariables, and the consequencesof imposing
constraints that limit the ¯scal stance of governments.
One policy implication of the model is that if a government decides to
boost the economy through an expansionary ¯scal policy, in the short run
its currency will appreciate if the chosen instrument is a tax-cut, but it will
depreciate if it is a balanced-budget spending increase. This suggests that
the tax-cut package approved by the Bush Administration in 2001 might be
one of the determinants of the recent appreciation of the Dollar.4
The intuition behind this resultisthat, becauseinamodel inwhichRicar-
dianequivalence does not hold government bonds are perceived as net wealth
by economic agents, a reduction in taxes ¯nanced by government debt in-
creases short-run consumption. Since domestic consumption increases more
than foreign consumption, the pressure on relative money demand appreci-
ates the domestic currency.
On the contrary, if theexpansioniscarried out througha balanced-budget
policy, the negative wealth e®ect associated with the fact that domestic res-
idents have to pay higher taxes can depress relative consumption, therefore
reducing the demand for money and creating a pressure for depreciation
of the currency. According to the predictions of this model, therefore, the
imposition of ¯scal constraint such as the \Golden Rule" proposed by the
3Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996), Caselli (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and
Ganelli (2000) analyse balanced-budget policies in a NOEM framework.
4As we stress below (see Section 4), it is not our intention to claim that the appreciation
of the Dollar in recent years can be attributed only to the tax cut. We rather argue that
the ¯scal stimulus is one of the many factors that contributed to the strenght of the US
currency.
4UK government imply that, for a given amount of government spending, the
exchange-rate e®ect of a ¯scal shock will be a reduction of the external value
of the currency. The model therefore predicts that the ¯scal measures an-
nounced by Chancellor GordonBrown in the March 2002 Budget, including a
43 percent rise in healthspending to be ¯nanced mainly by anincrease in Na-
tional Insurance contributions, will not contribute to a further appreciation
of the Pound.
From a technical point of view, the model presented in this paper breaks
down Ricardian equivalence in the NOEM framework by combining the Re-
dux (Obstfeld and Rogo® 1995, 1996) model with an overlapping generations
structure of the Blanchard (1985) type. This allows us to make a step for-
ward in studying the international e®ects of government debt in the NOEM
framework.5
A model that analyses the interaction between monetary and ¯scal policy
in a framework characterized by imperfect competition, nominal rigidities
and non-Ricardian agents is provided by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002). In
spite of some similarities in the modelling strategy, our contribution can be
considered orthogonal to theirs. One important di®erence is that they model
a monetary union, while we focus on the °exible-exchange rate case. The
endogenous reaction of the exchange rate to debt policies allows us to study
¯scal spillovers between (rather than within) monetary areas.
In addition to contributing to the analysis of important policy issues such
as the above mentioned ones, our model can also reconcile the old and the
5Obstfeld and Rogo® stress the importance of studying this issue as follows: \Introduc-
ing overlapping generations in place of homogeneous in¯nitely lived agents would enrich
the dynamics while permitting real e®ects of government budget de¯cits" (Obstfeld and Ro-
go®, 1995, pag.654). Ghironi (2000) combines the NOEM framework with in¯nitely-lived
generations of the Weil (1989) type. He shows how introducing overlapping generations
can solve the \stationarity problem" displayed by several models in the literature.
5new paradigms for the analysis of ¯scal policy interdependence with respect
to the short-run spillover e®ects on output. In the original Redux framework,
the e®ect of a ¯scal shock on foreign output is negative, i.e. opposite to the
one derived in the two-country version of the MF model.6 In our model,
the expenditure-switching e®ect due to the short-run appreciation of the
exchange rate implies that the short-run output spillover of a debt-¯nanced
tax reduction is unambiguously positive. Introducing a ¯nite time horizon
therefore reconciles the NOEM framework with the MF tradition on this
point.
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section introduces
the model; section 3 derives and discusses the macroeconomic e®ects of gov-
ernment debt; section 4 discusses more in depth the policy implications of
the theoretical analysis already pointed out in this introduction; section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries in the world that we label Home and Foreign. In
each period n individuals are born in the Home country and 1 ¡ n in the
Foreign country. In each period every agent faces a constant probability of









1¡q: There is also a measure 1 of (in¯nitely lived) ¯rms in the
world, n of these are located in the domestic country, 1 ¡ n in the foreign
country. Firms have monopolistic power in the production of a di®erentiated
good. Both the ¯rms andthe goods that they produceare indexed by z²[0;1]:
The consumption of good z by domestic and foreign agents of age a is
given by





















where µ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods. The



















where p(z) and p¤(z) are respectively the domestic and foreign currency price
of good z: We assume that the law of one price holds. This means that,
denoting with E the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in
terms of home currency), the following relationship holds for each good
p(z) = Ep
¤(z) (3)
where p(z) and p¤(z) are the prices of the same good respectively in home
and foreign currency. It follows that the home and foreign consumer prices






















]¡µ(Cw + Gw) (5)
where Cw +Gw is world total (private plus public) consumption of the com-
posite good.7 Gt is to be interpreted as home government spending per-
capita, and an analogous interpretation holds for G¤
t.8 We assume that the
compositionof public consumption is thesame as the oneof private consump-
tion. In deriving the latter expression, we have also made use of the law of




P¤ : Yt(z) is the demand for
output per-¯rm. Since the n domestic ¯rms behave symmetrically, aggregate
output for the Home country is given by nYt(z): Dividing the latter by the
size of the domestic population we get per-capita Home output as Y PC =










We assume that domestic ¯rms only hire domestic agents and foreign ¯rms
only hire foreign agents in a perfectly competitive labour market. Further-
more, the only production factor is labour, with constant returns, and pro-
ductivityisindependentofage. Theproductionofeach ¯rm is therefore equal
to labour input according to the production function: Yt(z) = Lt: With im-
perfect competition in the goods market, the pro¯t maximising conditions





7Throughout the paper the superscript w denotes world variables, while P C denotes
per-capita variables.
8We assume that this variable is distributed independently of age. Individual and










where Wt and W¤
t are domestic and foreign nominal wages.
2.2 Private Agents
We now describe the optimisationproblem ofa representative domestic agent
of age a.9 Private agents derive utility from consumption, leisure and real
balances. In order to make aggregation across ages possible, we assume that
preferences are homothetic and separable in each component of the utility
function. The endowment of time in each period is normalized to 1: In the
exposition of individual variables that follows, the ¯rst index refers to the
age of the agents and the second to time. Therefore, La;t is the quantity of
labour supplied inevery period by the agents of age a at time t, and (1¡La;t)
is the agent's leisure.10
A standard assumption in this framework is the existence of insurance
companies. We assume that insurance companies pay a net premium of
(
1¡q
q ) on the agent's ¯nancial wealth for each period in which the agent is
alive, while they encash the agent's ¯nancial wealth if the agent dies.
Agents can hold ¯nancial wealth as real balances or as assets. Assets
held by domestic agents can take the form either of a credit against private
foreign agentsor ofgovernment debt. Inorder to simplify the notation, we as-
sume that all assets are de¯ned in terms of the composite consumption good.
Agents hold the amount of assets that maximizes their expected utility but
they are indi®erent to the composition of assets. In addition, Home agents
supply labour in the perfectly competitive labour market, receive shares of
9The optimization problem of the foreign agent, being analogous to the domestic one,
will not be presented in detail.
10An analogous notation holds for the other variables.
9pro¯ts from domestic ¯rms and pay lumps-sum taxes. A domestic represen-




























where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, Â and Ã positive parameters and
¦t
Pt = ¼t(h)(1 ¡ q) is the per-capita quota of domestic pro¯ts.11 F denotes
total assets holdings of the agent, rt is the real interest rate onbonds between
t ¡ 1 and t, Mt¡1 nominal money balances held at the beginning period t
and ¿t lump-sum taxes payable in the consumption good.12 The ¯rst order













+ Fa¡1;t] + Ha;tg (9)




11We assume that taxes and pro¯ts of domestic ¯rms are equally distributed across
domestic agents (and viceversa), independently of age. A uniform distribution across
agents, while obviously a simpli¯cation made for the sake of tractability, is not uncommon
in the literature (see, for example, Hau 2000). Note that, with n symmetric ¯rms in the
country, aggregate pro¯ts are given by n¼t(h); where the index h denotes a representative
domestic ¯rm. Dividing the latter by the size of the country's population n
(1¡q); we get
¼t(h)(1¡ q):
12We adopt Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996) timing convention, Mt therefore denotes money







Where it is the real interest rate on bonds between t¡1 and t: Equation (9)
gives individual consumption demand as a function of ¯nancial and human
wealth. The expression
1¡q¯
1+Â+Ã in (9) is the constant propensity to consume
out of total (¯nancial plus human) wealth. The propensity to consume is
an inverse function of the weights on real balances and leisure in the utility
function (Â and Ã) and of the agent's temporal horizon (it decreases as the











Where ®s;t is the present value factor, de¯ned as
®s;t = 1 when s = t; and
®s;t =
1
(1+rt+1):::::(1+rs) when s > t: Human wealth is de¯ned as the present
discounted value of potential gross earnings (that would be earned if the
agent chose to consume no leisure) plus pro¯ts minus taxes. However, since
leisure provides utility, agents will not choose to supply a quantity 1 of work
in each period. This is shown by equation (10).13 To gain some intuition on
the meaning of equation (10), it is useful to rearrange it as
(1¡ La;t)Wa;t = ÃPtCa;t
The above expression tells us that there is aninverse proportionality between
expenditure on consumption and expenditure on leisure (de¯ned in terms of
the opportunity cost of not working). Finally, equation (11) expresses the
fact that demand for real balances is a positive function of consumption and
a negative function of the nominal interest rate.
13Note that, when leisure does not provide utility (Ã = 0); equation (10) implies that
the agent inelastically supplies the unitary endowment of time for production.
11Summing across ages the above individual ¯rst order conditions and di-





















































































Notice that, in the aggregation of wealth, we have used the fact that both
taxes and real wages are invariant across ages. As a consequence, per-capita
human wealth is equal to individual wealth for each agent. In equation (15)
we have replaced the nominal wage with the expression deriving from the
pro¯t maximization problem of the ¯rms.







)(1¡ q)Ht+1+ (1 +rt+1)q¯C
PC
t (18)
In the case of in¯nite life (q = 1) equation (18) reduces to a standard Euler
equation. In that case human wealth is not important for predicting future
consumption.14
2.3 The Government
Government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt can be
¯nanced by seigniorage, lump-sum taxes and issuing of new debt, according
to the single-period budget constraint15




An analogous budget constraint holds for the foreign government.
2.4 Net Foreign Assets
Integrating the agents' private budget constraint across ages, and substitut-
ing for ¿t from the government budget constraint, we derive the following
14Frenkel and Razin (1996) develop a discrete time version of Blanchard (1985) model,
in which money and leisure do not provide utility and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption can di®er from unity. Equation (18) nests the Frenkel and
Razin logarithmic case when Â = Ã = 0.
15In addition, the government must also respect a No-Ponzi game condition. Since
the government has an in¯nite life horizon, the real interest rate applied to Dt in the
government budget constraint is (1+rt); as opposed to
(1+rt)
q in the private agents' budget
constraint.
13expression in aggregate terms16





Lt + rtFt ¡ Ct ¡ Gt +
+Dt+1 ¡ (1+ rt)Dt +
¦t
Pt
where, withobvious notation, pt(h) is the price set by a typical home ¯rm in a
symmetricequilibriumacross ¯rms. De¯ningnet foreign assetsas V = F¡D;
and dividing both sides by the size of the domestic population, we obtain a
current account equation in per-capita terms as follows
V PC

















The de¯nition of net foreign assets is similar to the one used by Obstfeld and
Rogo® (1995, 1996) to denote the net position towards the other country.
In our framework, however, the term \net" also indicates the fact that this
variable is net of assets issued by the domestic government. In the aggregate
the following must hold at any time: V = ¡V ¤: This implies the following
relationship in per-capita terms nV PC = ¡(1¡ n)V PC¤:
We assume that parameters do not vary across countries. Therefore, a
set of equations that are the equivalent of (6), (13), (14), (15), (18) and (20)
hold for the foreign country, together with an analogous budget constraint
for the foreign government.
16Notice that in this equation we have replaced the nominal wage with its value implied
by the pro¯t maximization condition.
142.5 The Initial Steady State
Since the model does not yield closed-form solutions, in order to assess the
macroeconomic impact of ¯scal policy we need to de¯ne a convenient initial
steady state around which we log-linearize the equations.
Similarly to Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) andGanelli (2000), we con-
sider an initial steady state in which net foreign assets, government spending
and government debt are all zero. We accordingly denote this steady state
using the subscript 0 : V0 = 0; V ¤
0 = 0; D0 = 0; D¤
0 = 0;G0 = 0;G¤
0 = 0:






0 = 1: In a steady state
de¯ned in this way, the initial per-capita values of output and consumption



















When the elasticity of substitution µ tends to in¯nity, the system approaches
perfect competition. In that case the steady-state value of consumption and
output is equal to 1
1+Ã, that is bigger than the expression given in (21), con-
sistently with the intuition on the role of imperfect competition in bringing
the economy to a sub-optimal steady state.
Equation (21) implies that the initial steady-state level of human wealth
















where R is the gross real interest rate de¯ned as R = 1+ r. In order to ¯nd
an expression for the initial real interest rate, we can substitute the above
expression, together with the steady-state value for consumption, in to the
law of motion of consumption (18).
17Our choice of the initial steady state implies ¿ 0 = 0:
15The terms in µ cancel out, and we ¯nd that the solution for the initial
gross real interest rate is the same found in the perfect-competition model
presented in Ganelli (2001), for the case of no initial debt. This is implicitly
given by the equation
R2










The solution for the real interest rate, therefore, is not a®ected by the as-
sumption of imperfect competition. The intuition for this result is that the
real interest rate is the intertemporal price of a consumption aggregate, that
does not depend on the elasticity of substitution between the di®erentiated
goods that are aggregated in it. Although equation (22) is a quadratic ex-
pression, it is possible to show that only one solution for R0 corresponds to
a well-de¯ned steady state, in which we have R0 > 1
¯.18
In what follows we log-linearize the model around the initial steady state.
As in Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) and Ganelli (2000), the variables
whose initial value is zero will be normalized using the value of initial con-
sumption given in (21).
2.6 Log-Linearization
The set of (per-capita) log-linearized equations that we will use to solve the
model is given below. Because of the simple way in which we will introduce
nominal rigidities, variables adjust totheir long-run values in the period after
the shock. Hats therefore denote long-run (the period after the shock) log-
deviations, and tildes short-run (the period of the shock) ones. Log-linear
variables are in lower cases. The price set by a typical foreign ¯rm in a
18See Ganelli (2001) for the details. Notice that, because of the presence of overlapping
generations, the steady-state value of the real interest rate is not tied down by the discount
factor how it would be in an in¯nite-horizon model.
16symmetric equilibrium is denoted by e p(f):
e p = ne p(h)+ (1 ¡n)[e e + e p
¤(f)] (23)
e p
¤ = n[e p(h)¡ e e] +(1 ¡ n)[e p
¤(f)] (24)
e y = µ[e p ¡ e p(h]+ e cw + e gw (25)
e y
¤ = µ[e p
¤ ¡ e p
¤(f)] + e c
w + e g
w (26)
b l = b y = ¡Ã
µ
µ ¡ 1
(b c+ b p¡ b p(h)) (27)
b l











(1 ¡ q)(1 +Ã)
R0
R0¡ q









¤ + q¯R0e c
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b p¤¡ e p¤
R0 ¡ 1
) (34)
c m¡ b p = ¡
b r
R0
+ b c (35)
c m






b c = (R0 ¡ 1)b v ¡ b p+ b p(h)+ b y ¡ b g (37)
b c¤ = (R0¡ 1)b v¤ ¡ b p¤ + b p¤(f) + b y¤¡ b g¤ (38)
b v = (¡e p+ e p(h)+ e y) ¡ e c¡ e g (39)
b v¤ = (¡e p¤ + e p¤(f) + e y¤)¡ e c¤ ¡ e g¤ (40)
e e = e p¡ e p
¤ (41)
Equations (23) to (41) are respectively the log-linearized versions of home
and foreign price indexes, demand equations, labour-leisure trade o® equa-
tions, Euler equations, long-run human wealth, short and long-run money
demand equations, long-run and short-run current account equations and
the purchasing power parity equation. The long-run money demand equa-
tions (35) and (36) are functions of the long run log-deviation of the real
interest rate. This is due to the fact that, with overlapping generations, the
real interest rate is not tied down by the Euler equation in the simple way
in which it was in Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) and in Ganelli (2000).
In the model presented in this paper it would still be in principle possible to
18derive an expression for the long-run real interest rate using equation (18).
The long run value of the real interest rate, however, being a function of
human wealth, is a®ected by policies that, like the one that we are going
to consider, involve intertemporal redistribution of taxation. This explains
why, contrary to Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) and Ganelli (2000), the
long-run log-deviation of this variable is not zero in this model.
3 Macroeconomic E®ects of Government Debt
In this section we consider a temporary reduction in taxes, ¯nanced by an
increase in debt, with long-run taxes adjustingto pay for the higher interests.
We introduce nominal rigidities in the form of one-period nominal stickiness
in the domestic currency price of home goods and in the foreign currency
price of foreign goods, as in Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996). The formal
derivation of the e®ects of this policy is presented in the Appendix. In this
section we rather provide some economic intuition underlying the results.
It is useful to notice that log-linearization of the government budget con-
straint (with constant money supply) around the initial steady state gives19
e g = e ¿ + b d (42)
The policy that we are considering leaves government spendingandshort-run
government debt unchanged. Therefore we have: ¡e ¿ = b d; i.e. the increase
in long-run government debt is equal to the reduction in short-run taxes.20
This result, combined with log-linearization of the long-run government
19The variables that enter the government budget constraint, being all zero at the initial
steady state, are normalized by initial consumption. For example e g = dGt
C0 :
20As already stressed, in the initial steady state ¿ 0 = 0 as well. A reduction in short-run
taxes will therefore imply negative taxes, which can be thought of as a subsidy. The fact
that taxes are negative does not alter our theoretical ¯ndings.
19budget constraint gives: (R0 ¡ 1) b d = ¡(R0 ¡ 1)e ¿ = b ¿: The latter equality
implies that the e®ects of a reduction in short-run taxes can be formally
captured by an increase in long-run taxes. A possible solution strategy is
therefore to ¯nd reduced forms in which long-run taxes appear as exogenous
variables.21
3.1 Short-run e®ects
Using the equations listed in the previous section, together with the one
period sticky-price hypothesis that allows us to set e p(h) = e p¤(f) = 0; it is
possible to reduce the log-linearized model to the two relationships







(b ¿ ¡ b ¿¤) (43)
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(b g ¡ b g
¤) (44)
where the composite parameters are summarized in Table 1.22
Table 1: Parameters of the model
¡1 =
(1¡q¯)
(1+Â+Ã)(1¡ q)(1+ Ã) R0
R0¡q > 0















Furthermore, subtracting the foreign from the home demand equation,
using the purchasing power parity equation and the sticky-price hypothesis
21Frenkel and Razin (1996) adopt a similar strategy.
22See the Appendix for a discussion of the signs.
20Figure 1: E®ects of debt on relative consumption and the exchange rate
e ~







we derive a simple relationship between relative output and the nominal
exchange rate
e y¡ e y¤ = µe e (45)
It is useful to notice that equations (43) and (44) constitute a pair of simul-
taneous equations in the two unknowns e e and e c ¡ e c¤: From the discussion
of the composite parameters presented in the Appendix, it can be proved
that (43) is downward sloping in the (e e; e c ¡ e c¤) space, while (44) is upward
sloping. Furthermore, an increase in future domestic taxes shifts both curves
rightward. It follows that the e®ects of the policy that we are considering
can be represented graphically in Figure 1 as a movement from E0 to E1 .
The analysis carried out in Ganelli (2002) shows that this policy increases
short-run consumption in a closed economy. In an open economy, however,
the question arises of which of the two countries bene¯ts more from it. The
fact that, with ¯nite life horizons, debt is perceived by agents as net wealth,
implies an expansionary e®ect of the intertemporal reallocation of taxation
21on domestic short-run consumption. This has an expansionary e®ect on
the other country, even if government spending is kept constant, due to the
absence of home bias in private consumption. The domestic agents, on the
other hand, will also discount the fact that with a positive probability they
will be alive next period and will have therefore to pay higher taxes, while
foreign agents will not have to worry about future higher taxes. Figure 1
shows clearly how all these di®erent e®ects combine together to determine
the ¯nal impact of the policy. A debt-¯nanced tax cut always increases
relative consumption.23
One of the obvious advantages of using an open economy setup is the
possibility to assess the impact of ¯scal policy on the exchange rate. In
Figure 1, the e®ect on the exchange rate apparently depends on which curve
shifts more to the right. The formal derivation of the results presented in
the Appendix, however, allows us to establish rigorously that the situation
depicted in Figure 1 is the only possible outcome, a temporary tax reduction
implies a decrease in e e; i.e. an appreciation of the domestic currency.
The intuition for this result is that the increase in money demand, due
to the increased relative consumption, determines an appreciation of the
domestic exchange rate. The subsequent expenditure switching e®ect, ex-
pressed formally in equation (45), lowers relative output. This result should
not be interpreted as implying that the ¯scal shock has a recessionary e®ect
on the Home country. We believe that the case in which both domestic and
foreign output increase, with foreign output increasing more, is the most re-
alistic one. In a version of the model with traded and non-traded goods, the
expansionary e®ect of government spending on nontradables would counter-
act the expenditure-switching e®ect due to the appreciation of the exchange
23Solving for macroeconomic variables in relative terms is common in this literature.
See, for example, Hau (2000) and Tille (2001).
22rate.24 This could mitigate, or reverse, the result that relative output falls.
Since on of the ambitions of the NOEM literature is to provide a new
workhorse model for the analysis of macroeconomic interdependence, it is a
natural exercise to compare our results to those of the two-country version
of the MF model.25 Although, given the static nature of the latter, it is not
possible to di®erentiate in it debt-¯nancedfrom balanced-budget expansions,
the e®ect of a ¯scal shock in MF is still the relevant benchmark for compar-
ison. In MF a ¯scal expansion brings about an appreciation of the exchange
rate. As stressed in Ganelli (2000), due to the reduction in consumption that
follows a ¯scal shock in a Ricardian setup, the Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995,
1996) Redux model produces the opposite result.
Inthe present model, the wealth e®ect (due to the presence ofoverlapping
generations) that increases relative consumption, therefore appreciating the
domestic currency, is the crucial link in making our results consistent with
the MF ones. Introducing deviations from Ricardian equivalence allows us
to bridge the gap between the old and the new paradigm in the analysis of
macroeconomic interdependence.
It is important to stress again, however, that not only our model is able to
restore in a microfounded framework the traditional Mundell-Fleming result,
but it also allows us to do something that the Mundell-Fleming (and the
Redux) model cannot do, namely it allows us to distinguish between the
e®ects of di®erent types of ¯scal policy.26
The analysis carried out so far refers to the e®ects on relative variables.
Ganelli (2000) points out how another important di®erence between the Re-
dux and the MF model is related to the e®ect of ¯scal policy on the level of
24See Lane and Perotti (2002).
25For a treatment of the two-country version of the MF model, see Dornbusch (1980).
26Using our framework we can analyze a debt-¯nanced tax cut, a balanced-budget in-
crease in government spending and debt ¯nanced increase in government spending, which
can be thought as the sum of the ¯rst two (see section 4.2 for a more detailed discussion).
23output in the other country. In MF the output spillover is positive, while in
the Redux model it is negative. In what follows we show how our model can
reconcile the old and the new paradigm even on this point.
It is well known that a in a two-country model like the one we are pre-
senting the level of a generic foreign variable can be decomposed as follows
(see Aoki 1981)
x¤ = xw ¡ n(x ¡ x¤) (46)
It follows that the results derived in this paper and those illustrated in the
closed-economy version of this model presented in Ganelli (2002) allow us to
remark on some e®ects on the levels of the variables, even without explicitly
solving them in reduced forms. The world economy is here the sum of the
home andof the foreign country. Perturbations that a®ect only one country's
policy variables, leaving the other country's ones unchanged, will therefore
a®ect world output and consumption in the same way as in Ganelli (2002).
Ganelli (2002) shows that a debt-¯nanced tax cut increases world output
when government spending is constant. Combining this with the reduction
in relative output derived in this paper, formula (46) implies that the output
spillover e®ect is, like in the MF framework, positive.
In summary, in the short-run a debt-¯nanced tax cut increases relative
consumption and decreases relative output. A naive interpretation of these
results could lead us to conclude that tax cuts unambiguously increase rel-
ative welfare, because of the higher consumption and leisure enjoyed by the
country that implements this policy relative to the other country.27 Using
an intertemporal model, however, allows us to take into account the future
e®ects of macroeconomic policies. In what follows we discuss the impact on
net foreign assets and other long-run variables. Our model implies that the
27The welfare e®ects of real balances are usually assumed to be negligible in this litera-
ture.
24short-run increase in relative welfare can be reversed by the long-run e®ects
on relative leisure and consumption, that go in opposite directions compared
to the short-run ones.
3.2 Long-Run E®ects
The long-run movements of output and consumption depend on the e®ect
that government debt has on long-run net foreign assets.28 These can be
investigated with the help of the following relationship, that can be derived
from the system of log-linearized equations that constitute our model
b v = (1 ¡ n)[(µ ¡ 1)e e ¡ (e c¡ e c¤) ¡ (e g ¡ e g¤)] (47)
Equation (47) tells us that an appreciation of theshort-run nominal exchange
rate decreases long-run net foreign assets.29 Furthermore, long-run net for-
eign assets are a negative function of short-run relative consumption and
relative government spending. Since under the policy that we are consid-
ering government spending is kept constant, we only need to worry about
the ¯rst two e®ects. We know from the previous sections that a temporary
tax cut always increases short-run relative consumption and appreciates the
short-run exchange rate (i.e. it lowers e e): Summing up these two e®ects in
equation (48) implies that long-run net foreign assets decrease following a
temporary debt-¯nanced tax cut.
Using the equations of the model it is also possible to derive the following
relationship between long-run net foreign assets and relative consumption
28In empirical work, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) ¯nd that the level of government
debt is an important driver of the net foreign asset position for both industrial and devel-
oping countries.
29Because of the way in which we de¯ned the exchange rate, a decrease in e e denotes an
appreciation of the domestic currency.
25b c¡ b c
¤ = (R0 ¡ 1)(
µ ¡ 1 +Ã
µ ¡1 +Ãµ
)b v (48)
that shows how the two variables vary in the same direction. Relative con-
sumption therefore decreases in the long run. It is also possible to derive an
expression for long-run relative output as a function of long-run net foreign
assets as follows
b y ¡ b y
¤ = ¡(R0¡ 1)(
Ãµ
µ ¡ 1+ Ãµ
)b v (49)
the above equation implies a negative relationship between relative output
andnetforeignassets. Following the policy thatweare considering, therefore,
long-run relative output increases.
The intuition behind the results that we derived is quite straightforward.
Following a domestic temporary expansion in debt, short-run relative con-
sumption increases. Obviously this worsen the net ¯nancial position of the
home country relative to the foreign country. Furthermore, the increase in
short-run relative domestic leisure makes the external position of the country
even worse. This pushes domestic agents to decrease their long-run consump-
tionof bothgoods andleisure, while the e®ect onforeignagents is symmetric.
It follows that the above illustrated long-run changes in relative variables are
achieved by an increase (decrease) in home output (consumption) and a re-
duction (increase) in foreign output (consumption). From the point of view
of the domestic country, therefore, the debt ¯nanced tax-cut has detrimental
welfare e®ects in the long run not only relative to the other country, but also
in absolute terms.
The desirability of this policy from a welfare point of view will therefore
dependonthe weightthat the governmentputs, inanaggregate social welfare
function, on theutility of the generations currently alive compared to the one
attached to the utility of future generations.
264 Policy Implications
In this section we use the model presented in this paper as a theoretical
benchmark in order to discuss some important policy issues already pointed
out in the introduction, such as the e®ects of the tax cuts implemented by
the Bush Administration in the US in 2001 and the e®ect of the \Golden
Rule" introduced by the UK government on the value of the Pound.
4.1 The US tax-cut
The ¯scal stimulus implemented by the Reagan administration in the 1980s,
which consisted ofa reduction in taxes associatedwithan increase in military
spending, was widely believed to be one of the causes of the appreciation of
the Dollar. In that circumstance, real world events proved to be conform
to economic theory, in the sense that the Dollar reacted to the ¯scal shock
exactly how the (then dominant) MF paradigm would have predicted. Since
the baseline Redux model predicts a depreciation of the domestic currency
following a ¯scal shock, it is not well equipped to explain exchange rate
episodes such as those that followed Reagan's tax cut. The model presented
in this paper, on the contrary, can reconcile an intertemporal approach with
the empirical plausibility of the MF framework on this point.
In the present-day policy context, the Bush Administration has imple-
mented a package of ¯scal measures that resembles those put forward by
Reagan in the 1980s. The ¯scal plan presented to the Congress in February
2001 included estimated tax cuts for a total amount of about 1,6 trillion of
Dollars, to be realised in the period 2002-2011. In May 2002, the Congress
approved tax cuts for a total of about 1,35 trillion of Dollars. The Bush
Administration presented these ¯scal cuts as permanent ones, claiming that
they will be ¯nanced by the estimated budget surpluses for the period under
consideration. The Congressional Budget O±ce, however, estimated that
27the tax-cut plan will weaken the federal budget by about 1,8 trillions of Dol-
lars by the end of 2011 (CBO 2001) and several observers have stressed the
long-run sustainability problem posed by these measures (see, for example,
Bergsten 2002). If these concerns are to be believed, Bush's ¯scal policy can
be seen as one that will necessary imply some kind of adjustment, involving
an increase in taxes at some point in the future. The simple policy exper-
iment that we have carried out in this paper could therefore contribute to
explain some of the consequences of the 2001 tax cuts. From this point of
view, although the appreciation of the US currency had already started since
1997, it is not implausible to argue that Bush's ¯scal policy has contributed
to the strength of the Dollar in 2001. A con¯rmation of this view can be
found in the fact that simulations carried out by the National Institute's
model of the world economy indicate that a large part of the appreciation of
the Dollar exchange rate in the ¯rst quarter of 2001 can be attributed to the
Bush plan (NIESR 2001).
Obviously, our stylised model does not consider a lot ofimportant factors,
most notably theendogenous response ofthe monetary authority toexchange
rate changes. While we do not have the ambition, in this paper, to present
a model that gives a full account of the appreciation of the US currency in
the recent years, we believe that our analysis can contribute to explain how
the tax-reduction policy can be considered as one factor (among the many)
that has contributed to the strength of the Dollar.
The analogy with the Reagan tax cut also needs to be taken with a note
of caution. As documented by Bergsten (2002), following the deterioration
in the current account position due to the strength of the dollar in the period
1980-1985, the exchange rate fell by 50 percent during 1985-1987. However,
the US were in the 1980s the world's largest creditor country, while today
they are the largest debtor. This implies that the negative e®ects of a tax-cut
28policy on the exchange rate could manifest themselves quicker than in the
1980s.
4.2 Debt Financed Versus Balanced Budget Govern-
ment Spending: Exchange Rate Implications of
the UK Golden Rule
The theoretical results derived in this paper have some implications for the
comparison of di®erent methods of ¯nancing public expenditure. In partic-
ular, a debt-¯nanced increase in government spending can be thought of as
the sum of a balanced-budget increase in government spending and of a debt
¯nanced tax cut. Combining equations (43) and (44) it is possible to derive
the following reduced form for the exchange rate in which the \debt" e®ect































(e g ¡ e g
¤) (50)
We already know that the \debt" e®ect tends to appreciate the exchange
rate. On the contrary, the \balanced-budget" e®ect, consistently with the
Redux result, tends to depreciate it.30 It follows that, for a given level of
government spending, the e®ects on the exchange rate can potentially be





¡4) < 0: See the Appendix for a discussion of the parameters.
31Noticing that ¡1 approaches zero as q approaches unity, equation (53) suggests that
the \debt" e®ect is more likely to dominate when the deviation from Ricardian equivalence
is large.
29This theoretical analysis can help us understanding the e®ects that poli-
cies based on limiting the size of budget de¯cits, such as the \Golden Rule"
proposed by the UK government, can have on the level of the exchange rate.
The \Golden Rule", that re°ects the principles enshrined in the Finance Act
1998 and in the Code for Fiscal Stability, approved by theHouse of Commons
in December 1998, requires that, over the economic cycle, the government
borrows only to invest and not to fund current spending.
The concerns of the UK government in introducing such a rule were
related to the need of ensuring the solvency of public ¯nances and inter-
generational fairness. While we do not intend to take any stance, in this
paper, on the debate on whether the \Golden Rule" is either a necessary or
a desirable instrument in order to achieve these goals, we would like to stress
the (probably unintentional) implications of the \Golden Rule" for the issue
of UK membership in the EMU.
One of the concerns on this point is, in fact, linked to the strong value
of the Pound. It is widespread opinion that, if the UK decided to join the
EMU, a devaluation of the Pound would be desirable before joining. While
an o±cial realignment would probably be unfeasible for political reasons,
our theoretical analysis suggests that imposing the constraint that current
government spending can only be ¯nanced by an increase in current taxa-
tion can have the e®ect of reducing (or of limiting the appreciation of) the
Pound/Euro exchange rate.
From this point of view, the Golden Rule would seem at least as desirable
as theful¯llmentof the other economic tests proposedby theUK government,
as a requirement to be satis¯ed prior joining the EMU.32 As already stressed
in the introduction, an example of the \balanced-budget approach" that the
32Although our model is a two-country one, the fact that equation (53) is independent
of the size parameter n implies that it can be used to analyze Pound/Euro exchange rate
issues.
30UK government chose to follow is given by the fact that the health spending
announced by the Chancellor for the 2002 Budget implies a simultaneous
increase in current taxes. On the basis of the analytical results of our model,
we expect the exchange rate e®ects of the UK ¯scal expansion to be di®erent
from the US ones.
5 Conclusions
This paper combines the Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995,1996) framework with an
overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985) type. Analytical
results suggest that a temporary reduction in taxation by the domestic coun-
try, matched by an increase in long-run taxes to meet the increased interests
burden, unambiguously raises short-run relative consumption. The e®ect
of the latter on relative money demand also implies an appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate and a reduction of relative output in the short-run.
The international output spillover is unambiguously positive in the short-
run. These results represent a signi¯cant step forward in reconciling the old
and the new paradigms for the analysis of ¯scal policy interdependence.
The increase in short-run relative consumption reduces long-run net for-
eign assets, and this has, in turn, a negative e®ect on long-run domestic
consumption and leisure. The latter e®ects are also reinforced by the short-
run increase in relative leisure.
The main advantage of using a non-Ricardian setup is the possibility of
comparing the e®ects of di®erent types of ¯scal policy. Our model shows
that the exchange rate e®ects of a balanced-budget increase in government
spending are opposite to the ones that follow a debt-¯nanced tax cut. The
policy implications of these results in relation to current events in the US
and UK economies have been highlighted in the paper.
Although the econometric analysis of ¯scal policy is a ¯eld still in its
31infancy, a number of authors have attempted to assess the dynamic impact
of ¯scal shocks on macroeconomic variables in a closed economy. A non-
exhaustive list of papers include Blanchard and Perotti (2001), Fatas and
Mihov (2000), Mountford and Uhlig (2002) and Perotti (2002).
One result highlighted by these researchers is the failure of both the Real
Business Cycle and New Keynesian, in¯nite-horizons traditions to produce
theoretical models that match the empirically documented positive response
of consumption to ¯scal shocks in the short run. Our analysis shows that in-
troducing non-trivial deviationsfrom Ricardianequivalencecanhelpbridging
the gap between theoretical and empirical research on this point. An em-
pirical test of the implications of the model, that would extend the analysis
of the above mentioned authors to the two-country case, is an interesting
avenue to follow for future research.33
Also, building a version of the model with multi-period nominal rigidities
and allowing for an endogenous response of the monetary authorities to ex-
change rate changes would allow to analyse an even wider range of policies.
This wouldcome, however, at the price ofgivingup the possibility of deriving
analytical solutions.
33The author is currently working in this direction.Appendix
Formal derivations of the results
E®ects on Relative Consumption
It is possible to combine equation (44) with equation (43) in order to
derive a reduced form for relative consumption as follows:





























(b g ¡ b g
¤) (51)
As explained before, the e®ect of a reduction in domestic short-run taxes
¯nanced by debt is given by ¡d(e c¡ e c¤)=de ¿ = (R0 ¡ 1)[d(e c ¡ e c¤)=db ¿]: From















In order to evaluate the ¯nal e®ect of the policy that we are considering we
need therefore to determine the signof theexpressiongiven in (52). We know
that in the initial steady-state R0 > 1
¯ > 1; which ensures that (R0 ¡ 1) =
r0 > 0: Furthermore, it implies that ¡1 > 0: Since given the parameters we
know that ¡3 > 0; we can also conclude that the magnitude in the square
bracket in equation (52) is negative. Assuming for the moment that ¡2 > 0;
we have 1
(¡5¡¡4) < 0: If ¡2 > 0 is true, therefore, the expression in (52)
is the product of two negative terms (the one in the square bracket and
(R0 ¡ 1)
1
(¡5¡¡4)) and of a positive one (
¡1
¡2(1+Ã)): In this case the policy that
34We are now keeping government spending ¯xed in both countries in every period. This
implies e g = e g¤ = b g = b g¤ = 0:
33we are considering would have a positive e®ect on relative consumption. In
order to establish this result we need therefore to prove that ¡2 is positive.
To demonstrate this, let's remember that in the case in which the agents
have in¯nite life R0 takes the value
1
¯ in the initial steady state around which
we are log-linearizing. Although we can not set q exactly equal to 1 without
making the model collapse to a Ricardian economy, substituting R0 = 1
¯ in
¡2 can give some insight on what the e®ect will be in situations in which the






















(µ ¡ 1 +Ã)
and the latter expression is clearly positive: A generalisation of this result
follows if we notice that, holding other things constant, ¡2(R0) is increasing
in R0 (because
R0
R0¡q is decreasing in R0): Therefore, when we remove the
\approximation" that R0 =
1
¯; by restoring R0 to its true value that is
bigger than 1
¯; we simply strengthen the conclusion that ¡2(R0) > 0: We
can therefore conclude that the home country would bene¯t more than the
foreign country, in terms of increased consumption, from implementing the
policy that we are considering.
E®ects on Relative Output and the Exchange Rate
We already know, from (45), that there is a simple relationship between
relative output and the exchange rate. Solving for one of these two variables,
therefore, also provides a reduced form for the other. The easiest way to do it
is to put together equations (43) and (44), eliminating relative consumption






























(b g ¡ b g
¤) (53)
where ¡6 = ¡¡1
5 and ¡7 = ¡¡1
4 : The last equation and equation (45) imply
that the e®ects of the policy that we are considering on the exchange rate
and on relative output are given by























¡d(e y ¡ e y
¤)=de ¿ = (R0 ¡ 1)d(e y ¡ e y
¤)=db ¿ =





















To determine the e®ect of a temporary reduction in taxes, formally captured
by an increase in long-run taxes, let's notice that we already know that





¡2 < 0 in the selected steady state. The sign of the
e®ect will therefore depend on the sign of the expression in square brackets
in equations (55) and (56). With simple algebraic rearrangements, the latter











¡2q¯ + (R0 ¡ 1)
(57)
35(57) will be bigger than zero as:
1 <
µ ¡1 +Ãµ
µ ¡ 1 +Ã
= ¡3
Since the condition for the latter equality to be satis¯ed is µ > 1; that is
always true, the term that we are evaluating is always positive. This in
turn means that (R0 ¡ 1)de e=db ¿ and (R0 ¡ 1)d(e y ¡ e y¤)=db ¿ are negative: a
temporary tax reduction undertaken by the home country appreciates the
domestic currency and lowers relative output.References
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